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Abstract
Recent empirics report that transport cost reductions significantly
contribute to rapidly growing world trade. This paper develops a
reciprocal market model of intra-industry trade with transboundary
pollution from consumption to consider how market integration in the
form of transport cost reductions affects the noncooperative choice
of an environmental policy and the equilibrium welfare. I show that
market integration can improve welfare locally, but that welfare under
any non-prohibitive trade cost can not be higher than welfare under
autarky. This possibility of trade losses exhibits a sharp contrast to
the case of production-generated pollution.
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1 Introduction
Recent empirical studies suggest that transport cost reductions are an im-
portant factor of growth in world trade flows along with reductions in pro-
tectionist trade policies. For example, in an influential work, Baier and
Bergstrand (2001, p. 19) conclude that ‘income growth, tariff rate reductions,
and transport-cost declines all contributed nontrivially to the real growth of
world trade.’1 Despite this fact, Krugman (1995, p. 328) states that ‘inter-
national economists · · · tend to view much, though not all, of the growth of
trade as having essentially political causes, seeing its great expansion after
World War II largely as a result of the removal of the protectionist measures.’
On the other hand, growth of trade flows over the last decades has gen-
erated new concerns to be tackled. ‘Trade and the environment’ is one such
concern and there is a large literature in this field.2 Particularly, Conrad
(1993), Barrett (1994), Kennedy (1994), Rauscher (1994), Ulph (1996), and
Tanguay (2001) explore the consequences of noncooperatively chosen envi-
ronmental policies in open economies with oligopoly. These papers com-
monly find that countries choose laxer environmental regulation than the
efficient level. Incorporating trade barriers such as import tariffs and export
subsidies into the above literature, Walz and Wellisch (1997), Burguet and
Sempere (2003), Baksi and Chaudhuri (2009), and Fujiwara (2010) consider
how reductions in trade barriers affect the equilibrium environmental policy
and welfare. While the former two papers prove that trade liberalization is
welfare-improving under local pollution, Baksi and Chaudhuri (2009) show
that the same is no longer true of transboundary pollution.
However, the above claim of Krugman (1995) also applies to environ-
mental economics and there is no literature except for Straume (2006) that
addresses the impacts of transport cost reductions in a context of ‘trade and
the environment.’ Employing a framework similar to the above literature,
Straume (2006) examines how transport cost reductions affect the incentive
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toward policy coordination, concluding that market integration may reduce
the need for policy coordination.
This paper studies the effect of transport cost reductions on the envi-
ronmental policy and welfare, but my purpose differs from Straume’s (2006)
as follows. First, I pay much attention to transboundary pollution from
consumption.3 This comes from the observation that a certain share of pollu-
tion is caused by consumption, but it receives less attention in the literature.
For instance, use of cars and air-conditioners by households helps raise tem-
peratures of an individual country and possibly the world. Increased use of
ozone-depleting aerosol sprays is another instance of consumption-generated
pollution.4 Second, I focus on how transport cost reductions affect welfare.
While Kayalica and Kayalica (2005) and Kayalica and Yilmaz (2006) develop
a model similar to mine, they are interested in coordination and reform of
policies, not in gains from market integration. In this sense, my motivation
is closer to that of Walz and Wellisch (1997), Burguet and Sempere (2003),
and Baksi and Chaudhuri (2009).
Making use of a reciprocal market model which shares much with Kennedy
(1994) and Straume (2006) except for pollution from consumption, I estab-
lish the following results. First, market integration in the form of transport
cost reductions raises the emission tax. This is contrasting to the case of
production-generated pollution where trade cost declines lead to a reduction
in emission taxes.5 Second, for any non-prohibitive transport cost, welfare
under trade can not exceed welfare under autarky. In other words, mar-
ket integration involves no positive welfare gains relative to autarky. This
possibility of trade losses exhibits another contrast to the case of production-
generated pollution in which market integration can improve welfare as com-
pared to autarky. These findings provide a simple example suggesting that
welfare implications of market integration are crucially influenced by whether
pollution is caused by production or consumption.6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model and derives
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the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Section 3 considers welfare effects
of market integration and proves the impossibility of trade gains. Section 4
concludes the paper.
2 A model
2.1 Fundamentals
Consider two symmetric countries (Home and Foreign), two goods (goods
1 and 2) and one factor (labor).7 We asterisk all the Foreign variables to
distinguish them from the Home variables. One unit of Good 2 (numeraire)
is produced from one unit of labor so that the wage rate is unity in both
countries. Production of Good 1 incurs a constant marginal cost c ≥ 0 and
imports are subject to a per-unit transport cost t ≥ 0. The market of Good
1 in each country is segmented and duopolized by a Home firm (firm X)
and a Foreign firm (firm Y).8 The product each firm produces is a perfect
substitute.
Assume a representative consumer whose utility function is
u = aC1 − C
2
1
2
+ C2 − v(Z), a > 0, v′ > 0, v′′ ≥ 0, (1)
where u is utility, Ci, i = 1, 2 is the consumption of each good, Z is pollution
in Home, and v(·) represents damages from pollution. To compute the closed
form of equilibrium, I will specify v(Z) = sZ (linear damage) and v(Z) =
sZ2/2 (quadratic damage) as in Straume (2006). Letting p denote the relative
price of Good 1, utility maximization under the budget constraint yields a
linear inverse demand function: p = a − x − y, where x (resp. y) is the
supply of the Home (resp. Foreign) firm into the Home market. The Foreign
demand is analogously obtained as p∗ = a− x∗ − y∗.
Suppose that consumption generates a proportional emission on which
each government imposes an emission tax τ and τ ∗. That is, the Home (resp.
Foreign) government levies τ (resp. τ ∗) on x + y (resp. x∗ + y∗). I allow
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pollution to be transboundary. The model consists of two stages. In the first
stage, two governments noncooperatively set an emission tax to maximize
welfare. Taking the determined taxes given, firms play a Cournot-Nash game
in the second stage. The game is solved with backward induction.
2.2 A duopoly game
This subsection solves the second stage of the game. Given assumptions
above, the duopolistic firms’ profit is defined by
Home firm : (a− c− τ − x− y)x+ (a− c− τ ∗ − t− x∗ − y∗)x∗
Foreign firm : (a− c− τ − t− x− y)y + (a− c− τ ∗ − x∗ − y∗)y∗.
Firms choose outputs to maximize profits with a Cournot-Nash conjecture.
Then, the first-order conditions for profit maximization yield the equilibrium
outputs:
x =
a− c− τ + t
3
, x∗ =
a− c− τ ∗ − 2t
3
(2)
y =
a− c− τ − 2t
3
, y∗ =
a− c− τ ∗ + t
3
. (3)
Making use of (2) and (3), we see that the maximized profit of the Home
(resp. Foreign) firm equals x2 + x∗2 (resp. y2 + y∗2).
Regarding the specification of transboundary pollution, I suppose that
θ ∈ [0, 1] fraction of the Foreign emission arrives in Home, which implies
that Z = x + y + θ(x∗ + y∗). In the same way, pollution in Foreign is equal
to Z∗ = θ(x + y) + x∗ + y∗. By definition, θ = 0 (resp. θ = 1) corresponds
to local (resp. global) pollution. From these assumptions and the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium outputs in (2) and (3), Home’s welfare is measured by a
function of τ and τ ∗ as follows.
U(τ, τ ∗, t) =
(x+ y)2
2
+ x2 + x∗2 + τ(x+ y)− v (x+ y + θ (x∗ + y∗))
=
1
2
[
2(a− c− τ)− t
3
]2
+
(
a− c− τ + t
3
)2
+
(
a− c− τ ∗ − 2t
3
)2
5
+τ · [2(a− c− τ)− t]
3
− v
(
2(a− c− τ)− t+ θ[2 (a− c− τ ∗)− t]
3
)
,
(4)
where the first term of the right-hand side is consumer surplus, the second
and third terms are the Home firm’s profit, the fourth term is the emission
tax revenue, and the last term is the pollution damage. The assumption of
symmetry between Home and Foreign enables me to express Foreign’s welfare
as U(τ ∗, τ, t).
2.3 An environmental policy game
2.4 The linear damage case
This subsection turns to the first stage in which the governments noncooper-
atively choose an emission tax. From (4) and under the specification of linear
pollution damage sZ, the first-order conditions for welfare maximization are
∂U(τ, τ ∗, t)
∂τ
=
−2τ − t+ 2s
3
= 0
∂U(τ ∗, τ, t)
∂τ ∗
=
−2τ ∗ − t+ 2s
3
= 0.
Thus, the emission tax of each country is independent of the other country’s
tax in equilibrium. In other words, each country’s reaction curve is orthogo-
nal to each other in the τ − τ ∗ plane. Not surprisingly, this extreme property
comes from the assumption of linear damages from pollution.9 The reason
is that U(τ, τ ∗, t) becomes separable in τ and τ ∗, i.e., strategic interactions
vanish, under v(Z) = sZ.
Solving the above first-order conditions for τ and τ ∗, I have
τN = τ ∗N =
2s− t
2
, (5)
where superscript N represents the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Note
here that the equilibrium emission tax is equal to marginal pollution damage
if there is no transport cost.
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2.5 The quadratic damage case
While linear pollution damage is a convenient specification and frequently
assumed in the existing literature, it leads to an extreme outcome as shown
above. In order to consider the validity of the result in the last subsection, I
now replace the assumption of linear damage with that of quadratic damage.
Under the quadratic damage function v(Z) = sZ2/2, the first-order con-
ditions for welfare maximization are
∂U(τ, τ ∗, t)
∂τ
=
−2(2s+ 3)τ − 4sθτ ∗ + 4s(θ + 1)(a− c)− [2s(θ + 1) + 3]t
9
= 0
∂U(τ ∗, τ, t)
∂τ ∗
=
−4sθτ − 2(2s+ 3)τ ∗ + 4s(θ + 1)(a− c)− [2s(θ + 1) + 3]t
9
= 0.
These conditions characterize the reaction curve of each country, which is
negatively correlated, namely, strategic substitutes hold unless pollution is
local (θ = 0). Solving this system of the first-order conditions yields the
equilibrium emission tax:
τ˜N = τ˜ ∗N =
4φ(a− c)− (2φ+ 3)t
2(2φ+ 3)
, φ ≡ s(θ + 1), (6)
where a tilde indicates the quadratic damage case to distinguish it from the
linear damage case.
At this stage, it is helpful to make clear several properties of the equilib-
rium emission taxes in two cases. For this purpose, decompose τN and τ˜N
into two parts. The first part, which is given by the first term of the right-
hand side in (5) and (6), is a pollution-related term and the second term is
a trade-related term. The pollution-related term tells that higher taxes are
chosen as the damage parameter s increases.
On the other hand, the trade-related term states that transport cost re-
ductions induce higher emission taxes. The reason behind this finding is not
so straightforward since transport cost reductions have the following impacts.
First, lower transport costs promote competition and enhance consumer sur-
plus by lowering prices. Second, market integration expands the foreign firm’s
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market share in the domestic market and hence a part of the domestic firm’s
profit shifts abroad, reducing domestic welfare. Third, transport cost reduc-
tions increase wasteful resources associated with costly exporting as Brander
and Krugman (1983) point out. These three effects are present regardless
of the presence of pollution. In addition to them, market integration unam-
biguously increases pollution in each country since consumption increases.
While it is ambiguous whether emission tax revenue increases, it is fair to
say that tax revenue increases if the initial trade cost is sufficiently large.
The governments determine the emission tax so as to balance these effects.
Eqs. (5) and (6) state that the negative welfare effects of market integration
through profit-shifting, increasing waste, and pollution expansion dominate
the positive effect of increasing competition, thereby yielding higher emission
taxes.
3 Welfare effects of market integration
Taking into account the foregoing arguments, this section examines welfare
effects of transport cost reductions. I begin with the case of linear damage
and proceed to the quadratic damage case. Interestingly, I can show that
completely the same conclusion applies to both of these cases.
3.1 The linear damage case
Substituting (5) into (4) and specifying v(Z) = sZ, welfare in the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium is given by a function of the transport cost:
U
(
τN , τN , t
)
=
9t2 − 6(a− c− s)t+ 4(a− c− s)[2(a− c− s)− 3sθ]
18
≡ W (t). (7)
The rest of my task is to closely examine the properties of W (t).
I begin by comparing welfare levels under free trade (t = 0) and autarky
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(t = t), where t is a prohibitive level of transport cost defined by
t =
2(a− c− s)
3
,
by setting x∗ = y = 0 after substituting (5) into (2) and (3). If the transport
costs are higher than t, each duopolistic firm quits exporting and the resulting
equilibrium reduces to autarky. In order to guarantee non-negativity of t, I
make:
Assumption: a− c− s ≥ 0.
Evaluating (7) at t = 0 and t = t, I have
W (0) =
2(a− c− s)[2(a− c− s)− 3sθ]
9
W (t) =
2(a− c− s)[2(a− c− s)− 3sθ]
9
.
That is, welfare under free trade is equal to welfare under autarky. This is
an intriguing contrast to the case of production-generated pollution in which
I have either W (0) > W (t) or W (0) < W (t) depending on the magnitude
of s.
I next examine the slope of W (t). Differentiating (7) with respect to t
once and twice yields
W ′(t) =
3t− (a− c− s)
3
, W ′′(t) = 1,
from which W (t) is strictly convex and W ′(0) = −(a− c− s)/3 < 0. On the
other hand, the slope at the prohibitive trade cost becomes
W ′ (t) =
a− c− s
3
> 0.
Moreover, it is easy to show that W (t) reaches a bottom at t = (a−c−s)/3 =
t/2. Summarizing these results, I can establish:10
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Proposition 1: Market integration, i.e., a marginal decline in transport
costs, can improve the Nash equilibrium welfare if their initial level is smaller
than t/2. However, trade with any non-prohibitive transport cost can not
ensure strict welfare gains as compared to autarky, i.e., W (t) ≤ W (t) for
any t ∈ [0, t).
Proof: Straightforward by noting that W (t) is depicted as Figure 1. Q.E.D.
3.2 The quadratic damage case
Replacing the assumption of linear pollution damage with that of quadratic
pollution damage, this subsection proves that Proposition 1 survives the
assumption of quadratic damages from pollution. Substituting (6) into (4)
and using v(Z) = sZ2/2, the welfare level in the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium becomes
U
(
τ˜N , τ˜N , t
)
=
(2φ+ 3)2t2 − 2(2φ+ 3)(a− c)t+ 4[φ(1− θ) + 2](a− c)2
2(2φ+ 3)2
≡ W˜ (t). (8)
Following the argument in the previous subsection, I will make clear several
properties of W˜ (t).
The first step is to compare welfare levels under t = 0 and the prohibitive
transport cost denoted by t˜. In view of that imports in equilibrium are
x∗ = y = [2(a− c)− (2φ+ 3)t]/[2(2φ+ 3)], the prohibitive trade cost is
t˜ =
2(a− c)
2φ+ 3
> 0.
Substituting t = 0 and t = t˜ into (8), we have
W˜ (0) =
2[φ(1− θ) + 2](a− c)2
(2φ+ 3)2
W˜
(
t˜
)
=
2[φ(1− θ) + 2](a− c)2
(2φ+ 3)2
,
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namely, both free trade and autarky give rise to the same level of welfare.
I next compute the slope of W˜ (t). Straightforward calculations yield:
W˜ ′(t) =
(2φ+ 3)t− (a− c)
2φ+ 3
, W˜ ′′(t) = 1,
which enables me to know that W˜ (t) is strictly convex and that W ′(0) =
−(a − c)/(2φ + 3) < 0. On the other hand, the slope at the prohibitive
transport cost is
W˜ ′
(
t˜
)
=
a− c
2φ+ 3
> 0.
Finally, I can check that W˜ (t) reaches a bottom at t = (a−c)/(2φ+3) = t˜/2.
Note that all of these results are in accordance with the result in the case of
linear damage. Thus, I have arrived at:
Proposition 2: The same conclusion as Proposition 1 on welfare effects of
market integration holds in the case of quadratic damages from pollution.
Proof: A diagram which is qualitatively identical to Figure 1 can be depicted
in the present case. All I have to do is replace W and t with W˜ and t˜,
respectively. Then, the proposition follows. Q.E.D.
3.3 Interpretations
Having formally proved the main results, I now consider the intuitions behind
them. As shown in the last section, the impacts of transport cost reductions
are decomposed into (i) the procompetitive effect, (ii) profit-shifting from
the domestic firm to the foreign firm, (iii) expands wasteful resources asso-
ciated with transport costs, (iv) pollution expansion through consumption
expansion, and (v) the change in emission tax revenue. Declines in transport
costs have the following direct effects: imports increase, domestic supply
decreases, and consumption increases whereas waste with transportation in-
creases. These changes in outputs increase the firm profit. On the other
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hand, market integration has indirect effects on welfare through the change
in emission taxes and we know that market integration leads governments
to raise emission taxes from Eqs. (5) and (6). As a result of higher emis-
sion taxes, imports decrease, domestic supply increases, and consumption
decreases. The firm profit decreases from this rise in taxes. Moreover, they
mitigate wasteful resources associated with costly imports, but it is ambigu-
ous whether emission tax revenue increases.
What deserves attention is that the direct and indirect effects on con-
sumption cancel each other out and thus consumer surplus and pollution
damage remain unchanged through market integration.11 Consequently, the
effects of market integration reduce to three effects: changes in the firm profit,
inefficiencies associated with wasteful trade, and emission tax revenue.
When the initial transport cost is high enough to satisfy t ∈ [t/2, t],
losses from wasteful trade dominate an increase in the firm profit. Moreover,
the emission tax revenue is sufficiently small. Therefore, market integra-
tion involves welfare losses. The opposite reasoning applies to the case for
t ∈ [0, t/2]. If trade costs are sufficiently small, inefficiencies associated with
wasteful trade are dominated by an increase in the firm profit. In addition,
governments choose a very high pollution tax, thus obtaining large tax rev-
enue. These positive effects outweigh the negative effects, resulting in welfare
improvements.
However, I should stress that welfare under trade with any transport
cost can not be higher than welfare under autarky. As Propositions 1 and 2
suggest, welfare under free trade (zero transport cost), which is a maximum of
W (t), is equal to welfare under autarky. This is because governments employ
very strict environmental regulation, from which the resulting equilibrium
coincides with autarky. This impossibility of Pareto superiority of free trade
over autarky is not obtained in the production-generated pollution case. In
this sense, our results highlight the importance of consumption-generated
pollution as stressed by Copeland and Taylor (1995).
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4 Concluding remarks
This paper has studied the implications of consumption-generated pollution
for welfare effects of market integration in the form of transport cost reduc-
tions. It is shown that trade with any transport cost including free trade
(zero transport cost) can not render positive welfare gains. Consumption-
generated pollution plays a key role behind this result.
I admittedly recognize that my analysis hinges on many simplifying as-
sumptions although all of them are frequently made in the existing literature
as well. In addition, while it is beyond the scope of this paper, it is meaning-
ful to make a parallel analysis by allowing for coexistence of production- and
consumption-generated pollution. Despite these restrictions, I believe that
my simplest model can yield some important implications of consumption-
generated pollution for welfare effects of market integration. It is my future
research agenda to explore the validity of my results in more general settings.
Notes
1. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) provide a comprehensive survey on
empirical studies on trade costs including Baier and Bergstrand (2001).
2. Focusing on perfectly competitive product markets, Copeland and Taylor
(2003) survey theoretical and empirical developments.
3. A parallel analysis in the case of production-generated pollution is found
in Fujiwara (2010).
4. There is an empirical literature that addresses some implications of
consumption-generated pollution for the Environmental Kuznetz Curve Hy-
pothesis. See, for example, Rothman (1998) and Bagliani et al. (2008). The
importance of consumption-generated pollution is highlighted in Copeland
and Taylor (1995).
5. See, for example, Proposition 1 in Straume (2006, p. 544).
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6. Fujiwara (2009) deals with tariff reductions, following the analysis of Bur-
guet and Sempere (2003) and Baksi and Chaudhuri (2009).
7. My model is basically the same as Straume’s (2006) except for that I
assume pollution from consumption and that he allows for product differen-
tiation.
8. See Brander (1981), Brander and Krugman (1983) and Helpman and
Krugman (1985, pp. 104-111).
9. In the case of production-generated pollution, reaction curves are non-
orthogonal even under linear damages.
10. The intuitions behind the result are postponed until Proposition 2 is
proved since the same interpretations apply both to Proposition 1 and to
Proposition 2.
11. From (2) and (3), the total supply in Home is x+y = [2(a−c−τ)− t]/3.
Thus, the effect of transport cost reductions becomes
d(x+ y)
dt
=
∂(x+ y)
∂τ
· dτ
dt
+
∂(x+ y)
∂t
=
−2
3
· −1
2
+
−1
3
= 0,
by considering (5) and (6).
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